( § 585), or such almost exclusionary "exceptions" as the place of performance provision ( § 358) in contracts law.
Responding to much criticism based on unfavorable answers to these questions in certain fields, the American Law Institute is now engaged in a wholesale revision of its venture. Whether cure and progress may be expected from a mere "continuation," or whether new techniques have to be devised can, I believe, best be judged from the distance and with the detachment of historical analysis. An introduction to such an analysis is attempted in this Article. 1 For this purpose the history of conflicts law can perhaps best be understood as a struggle between two tendencies, both of which continue to compete in the Restatement: one we may call unitarian, seeking to resolve or avoid conflict by the assumption of a superior legal order; the other we may call pluralistic, seeking to achieve this result by insisting on the exclusivity of each nation's (or state's) own law. The early interplay of these tendencies can be followed in Professor Yntema's masterful sketch on the "Historic Bases of Private International Law" -from a prenatal stage in the Empires of Rome and England, in which denial of conflict was supported by the political reality of "one world" and mercantile internationalism in law and trade-through early pluralistic inroads into unitarian thinking, variously expressed by the later "statutists" and partly neutralized by canonist and other natural law teaching-to the vigorous nationalism of the newly born sovereignties with their stress on mere "comity" in international relations. 'What remains to be done in order to see the problem of American conflicts law as created by Story and restated by Beale in its historical setting, is to analyze the doctrinal sources and results of their compromise from the near-denial of conflicts law under the pluralistic Dutch doctrine of comity, through the super-law concept 
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apply and later create Roman law; ' medieval Roman doctrine, though allocating legislative power to the several units of the declining empire, 10 had continued to think in terms of the all-embracing sovereignties of Pope " and Emperor. English law, while partly followifig Roman doctrine,' 2 had reached a similar result by the exclusion of foreign contacts: the jury was not to pass upon foreign facts,' 3 and the deed made 1 4 or tort committed ' 5 abroad could not be sued on in England. Although in the course of time mercantile needs had broken down these barriers and forced upon English courts jurisdiction over foreign facts,'" these courts had continued to forestall conflict by insisting on the application of English law.' 7 If resort to both Roman and common law sources thus failed American courts, they sought and found guidance in other legal systems.
Some of the American colonies had strong ethnical and cultural ties with the Netherlands. With regard to the treatment of international problems, these ties may have proved particularly effective in the early history of the United States which, like the Netherlands, had gained its independence from an empire; and British law itself had had early contact with Dutch legal scholarship. Whatever may have been the reason, this scholarship, primarily the writings of Ulric Huber and Johannes Voet with their rejection of the imperial heritage of a law "governing" by virtue of its own claim to authority "' and their stress 10. On the theory of the "statutists," see in general Yntema, supra note 1, at 303. 11. On the conflicts law of the canonists, see NEuMEYER, op. it. supra note 1, at 113; Van Hove, La territorialiti et la personnalit des lois en droit canomique' depuis Gratien (vers 1140) jusqu'4 Jean Anderae (-1348 . In a suit on a contract made and to be performed in Virginia, Doderidge, J. would, in contrast to Whitlock, J. (who had affirmed admiralty jurisdiction because the "civil ley" was applicable), apparently, at the plaintiff's choice, have permitted application of the common law in a common law court.
18. On this "statutist" theory, see, e.g., Yntema, supra note 1, at 303.
upon mere comity as the basis of applying foreign law, 9 was to gain great influence on the development of American conflicts law. Following earlier cases approving this approach, 20 Story relied primarily upon Huber's authority for which he found "undisputed preference on this subject over other continental jurists, as well in England as in America." Citing Huber, he states that "whatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, depends solely upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express and tacit consent." 2I Rejecting Continental attempts at establishing principles entitled to general recognition, Story approved ' the statement in Saul v. His Creditorss that this problem "touched the comity of nations, and that, that comity is, and ever must be uncertain." But this practice, while workable and proper enough in international relations, would soon have proved inadequate within the American Union. Louisiana courts, obligated to apply a legal system essentially different from that of other states, were in particular need of "certain principles." '4 It is understandable, therefore, that the Louisiana lawyer Livermore had declared the "modem" doctrine of courtesy "inconsistent with the very nature of a court of justice." 5 Although "comity" language nevertheless has remained with us until 19 the present day,' it was soon combined with theories better adapted to the needs of a country in which not only growing intercourse between member states demanded interstate law, but where the relations between states soon became less significant than relations between individuals whose very citizenship in the several states steadily lost meaning. Jurisdiction became the first vehicle of a new super-law of conflicts.
Super-Law

Judicial Jurisdiction
It has never been doubted that judgments recovered in the courts of one state are entitled to recognition in sister states, although the courts may at first have failed to utilize the Full Faith and Credit Clause for this purpose." But where compulsion rather than comity was to apply, some test had to be provided for the applicability of this compulsion. This test was based on the concept of the foreign court's "jurisdiction,"-a concept which was thus started on its victorious career both in interstate and international relations.
This extension of the concept of jurisdiction beyond its application to the forum's domestic authority-an application well-known to the Roman and Canon law of the Middle Ages --would not have caused difficulties more serious than those of terminology had it remained confined to interstate conflicts under the constitutional doctrine of full faith and credit or due process. But to this day the jurisdictional approach has been applied in both interstate and international conflicts law, 2 9 and has thus necessarily had to be predicated upon a supernational standard which, since the eclipse of the law of nations in both fields, has lacked a positive legal foundation. Historical analysis confirms
26.
For an excellent analysis of the comity theory in American law, see Cheatham, supra note 3, at 374. Regarding the current uses of the term, cf. this observation and, also, establishes the fact that this super-law of jurisdiction, far from being logically indispensable as the Restaters would lead us to believe, owes its present prevalence in the conflict of laws to one man-Joseph Story, the judge and scholar.
According to Story it is a "lawful" " or "legitimate" "' jurisdiction, "rightfully exercised," a which entitles the judgment of a foreign court to recognition in this country. This concept of jurisdiction Story apparently identifies with what he also refers to as "jurisdiction inter gentes, upon principles of public [international] law." n Thus, for laying down the "true doctrine," ' he relies on Vattel who, in connection with his discussion of the "rights of jurisdiction," remarks that "to undertake to examine the justice of a definitive [foreign] sentence is an attack on the jurisdiction of him [the sovereign] who has passed it." "' And Story's precedents taken from the law of admiralty are, of course, equally predicated upon concepts of public international law." 0 Where, on the other hand, Story leaves the laws of nations and admiralty and enters upon what we call today the law of conflict of laws, he has to break new ground in evaluating a foreign judgment with reference to a jurisdiction whose lawfulness is measured by standards other than those of the rendering court. Most of the cases relied on by Story concern the forum's own "local" rather than the foreign court's "international" or "interstate" jurisdiction." This is particularly true for the equity cases dealing with the forum's authority to interfere with foreign lands "without affecting the jurisdiction of the Courts" of the 30 . STORY foreign situs. 8 s It may be significant, therefore, that for his proposition that "every exertion of authority [by a sovereign beyond its own territorial limits though in accordance with its own laws] . . is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding . . in any other tribunals," " Story cites only his own opinion in Picquet v. Swan, 4° where the forum's jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen was denied for lack of proper service. The non-admiralty precedent primarily relied upon by Story in this case, as well as in his text, 41 is the well-known case of Buchanan v. Rucker. 4 2 Even here Lord Ellenborough, while denying the Island of Tobago the power "to bind the rights of the whole world" 4 by a judgment based on service violating minimum standards of fair notice, was careful not to deny Tobago's jurisdiction under her own law.
It is true that, nevertheless, Story's concept of a jurisdiction independent from the laws of both the rendering court and the forum was probably not unknown to the courts of his time. As early as 1786, in Kibbe v. Kibbe," 4 one of the earliest cases reported in this country, involving a suit in Connecticut on a Massachusetts judgment, the defendant countered the plaintiff's reliance on the fact that the proceedings underlying that judgment "were conformable to the laws and customs" of Massachusetts, by claiming that these proceedings were "altogether "aThe twenty-seven colonies abroad cannot make a law contrary to the law of England, but they can make any law agreeable thereto, and to the principles of justice," Fisher v. Lane, supra at 303). See also When adopting these standards for judging the "lawfulness" of foreign jurisdiction under a law other than that of the rendering court, Story might well have chosen another term for distinguishing from this "international" jurisdiction the "local" jurisdiction of the forum. His failure to do so and his use of the term "jurisdiction" with reference to both the forum and the foreign court would have been serious enough had this jurisdictional language remained limited to the law of recognition of foreign judgments. But Professor Beale and the Restatement have carried it far beyond this field into the law of choice of law by their discovery of "legislative jurisdiction."
Legislative Jurisdiction
Comity had threatened to "put the conflict of laws out of joint and . . . placed the whole subject on a basis where it nearly perished." "I In the choice of law, too, a new approach was needed. Unfortunately it was found in a false analogy to that "territorial theory" " under which a foreign judgment was held entitled to recognition if issuing from a court having "lawful jurisdiction" in an inter- 2 Beginnings of this approach may be found in Story's treatment of interstate loan contracts. As stated elsewhere, early American courts showed a solicitude for money lenders (strange to modern ways of thinking and certainly to present law) " which led them to apply "liberal" foreign laws over the usury laws of the forum. 4 If this practice was to be founded in deductive reasoning, it could not be based on the doctrine of comity alone. To exclude the applicability of the law of the forum, the legislating state had to be given a "power" not explainable by that theory. And Story effected this exclusion by reasoning "that no country can give to its own laws an extra-territorial authority, so as to bind other nations. If it undertakes to legislate in regard to acts or contracts performed elsewhere, it can claim for its own laws no other validity than the comity of other nations may choose to allow towards them." " While including a reference to comity, this statement assumes a supernational assignment of exclusive legislative authority to the state in which the contract is performed. Significantly, Story's main authorities for this assumption were the writings of those very continental jurists who, following in the footsteps of the statutists, had "endeavoured to collect principles, which ought to regulate this subject among all nations," and whose efforts he had rejected as adapted to "a common empire" rather than to an independent nation." 6 The extension of jurisdictional thinking into the field of choice of law may have been facilitated in Anglo-American law by the fact that in English law the separation of legislative and judicial powers has been slower and perhaps less total than in countries governed by the civil law, 5 7 and that, in this country at least, this extension may have filled, from a functional viewpoint, a gap created by a peculiarity of the judicial process. Owing to a medieval concept of physical power, the court is given authority over any defendant "served with process" If such purely accidental "jurisdiction" is to create a claim to recognition even in a sister state with closer contacts with the case, it may have seemed necessary in certain situations to assume a compulsion of the judgment court to apply the law of that state.
But it remained for Professor Beale fully to merge judgment recognition and choice of law under an all-embracing concept of jurisdiction."
9 Without accepting the statutists' stress on the interpretation of the law to be applied, Beale thus built upon their assumption of a supernational unitarian order without taking account of the fact that at their time that assumption had a real or at least ideological basis in the common Roman law long since defunct. What to Story had been but an isolated solution of specific situations, thus became the dogma of "legislative jurisdiction," which has decisively affected the history of choice of law in this country. What could have become a discipline subject to considerations and pressures of social policy like all other branches of the law, came to be determined by an axiomatic rule directly traceable to medieval sources: ". . . no statute has force to affect any person, thing, or act . . . outside the territory of the state that passed it." 0 This "rule" presupposes a complete system of a super-law determining the location of persons, things, and acts which has never existed and will never exist, as well as a simplicity of choice of law principles (such as lex delicti or lex contractus) which, if it has ever prevailed, has long yielded to progressing diversification and refinement. 1 Moreover, the concept of legislative jurisdiction is based on an analogy between foreign judgments and laws which has long ceased to apply. To recognize a foreign judgment meant to give deference to an act of another sovereign, to an expression of his will and opinion. the same observation applied to some extent to legislative acts prompted by a desire to remedy individual evils. When and in so far as older statutes served this purpose, their similarity to judicial acts may, therefore, have justified to some extent a concept of legislative "jurisdiction." But no such similarity exists between judgments and modern statutes phrased in general and abstract terms. If we choose, nevertheless, to apply such statutes of a foreign sovereign, we do so although the latter has ordinarily been unaware, and may even have disapproved, of such application. And, on the other hand, we neither violate international comity nor foreign legislative jurisdiction if we refuse to apply such statutes.
Notwithstanding inherent theoretical difficulties, 62 a jurisdictional approach to the recognition of foreign legislation might have remained manageable if Story's successors had limited it, as Story in effect did, to certain types of statutes as to which deference to another sovereign perhaps justified the jurisdictional analogy. This, however, Story's successors ' did not do, and, indeed, could not do. The "original sin" of the compromise inevitably created new problems. and Story's comity theory. Though admitting the national source of all conflicts law, Savigny insisted on the demands of a supernational "community of law," based on a common Christian culture, mutual interest, and the postulate of "uniformity of decision," i.e., the need for identical decisions of each case wherever brought. (This principle, never totally forgotten, seems to have gained renewed attention.
As to repeated and recent attempts of the
See PAGENSTECHER, DER GRUNDSATZ DES ENTSCHEIDUNGSEINKLANGS IM INTER-NATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1951)).
Savigny assumed that, by analyzing the "legal nature" of the foreign elements of a case, the law best applicable to it could be ascertained. His stress in this connection on the "seat" of an obligation, though often ridiculed ("obligations do not sit at all or, if they do, they sit on two stools," Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, in 1851, gave his famous speech on "Nationality as the Basis of the Law of Nations" in which, following a principle first adopted in the French Civil Code, he gave the decisive impulse to that movement which has since, in civil law countries, led to the far-reaching displacement of the domicile principle still prevalent in Anglo-American law. Moreover, distingushing between
Vested Rights
Once foreign law was to be given recognition on jurisdictional grounds, it seemed hardly feasible to exclude from this recognition a common law which, increasingly, had come to differ from state to state. The Restaters avoided this discrimination under their theory of "vested" rights and obligations " which they borrowed from a time-honored concept developed by the same law of nations, that had given to Story the concept of jurisdiction.
5 They were assisted in the creation of this theory by a shift in the concept of conflicts law itself.
As we have seen, the comity element of Story's teaching is concerned with relations between sovereigns, and thus truly a concept of international law. But, as Story knew, the law of conflicts is "chiefly seen and felt in its application to the common business of private persons, and rarely rises to the dignity of national . . . controversies." 66 This realization later induced Lord Blackburn to deny the law of France the power "to bind the whole world" by a judgment which, lacking "jurisdiction," failed validly to impose an (ubiquitous) "obligation" on the defendant. 6 T Though circular in characterwhether or not such an obligation exists must, like "jurisdiction," again be determined by superlaw concepts-Blackburn's terminology the rules created in the interest of private persons and those for the protection of public order, Mancini accepted an international obligation to recognize only the former. Largely pluralistic in its result (stressing the public policy exception), this theory is unitarian in its character. Mancini has been followed in Belgium by Laurent and in France by Andr6 Weiss, and has had considerable impact on European legislation (e.g., the Saxon Code of 1863). He collaborated in the drafting of the "Preliminary Provisions" of the justified perhaps the use of the term "private international law." This expression, first adopted by Story " and later abandoned in this country, has, as "international private law," become common usage abroad, 9 and has prepared the ground for the theory of "vested rights." According to the Restatement, "a problem of jurisdiction" concerns the "extent to which a state may create interests which will be recognized in other states," '0 and such interests, whether based upon statute or common law rules, "may, in certain cases, depend upon the law in force of some other state or states." T' These (unitarian) statements, which assume an "extraterritorial" effect of foreign laws through the creation of ubiquitous interests, are, like the concept of an international jurisdiction, irreconcilable with the Restatement's (pluralistic) proposition that "the only law in force in the sovereign state is its own law." 72 At first glance, the vested rights theory, 78 like that of vested "obligations," appears but as another formulation of the jurisdiction test to the effect that if, and only if, a right was "vested" in the plaintiff by a foreign court "having jurisdiction," the foreign judgment is entitled to recognition. 74 Once the test of recognition is thus shifted from the source of the law (jurisdiction) to its product (obligation and In Italy, Anzilotti's original "material reception" theory, though purportedly based on local law, would incorporate therein the entire foreign law. In Great Britain, Dicey is the great protagonist of the vested rights approach which is fully shared by Schmitthoff, 74. Cf. Chief Justice Marshall in Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 240, 268 (U.S. 1808), examining the jurisdiction ("power") of the first forum to determine "whether its sentence has changed the right of property." right), Story's jurisdictional discrimination between statute and common law has disappeared. But so has, at the same time, the last excuse for the analogous treatmeat of foreign judgments and foreign law for the purposes of recognition. 75 The compromise has failed. A new beginning must first overcome the strong support which the inconsistencies appearing in Story's and the Restaters' formulations have found in the opinions of three great American jurists.
Holmes, Hand and Goodrich
Justice Holmes' conceptualistic views in the law of conflicts contrast strangely with his iconoclastic realism in other fields of the law. Again and again we find Justice Holmes basing his opinions in conflicts cases on the tacit or express assumption of that "transcendental body of law outside of any particular state," whose existence he denied so vigorously elsewhere; 76 i.e., a body of law which endows each state with the "power" to create obligations 7 and rights entitled to recognition and enforcement by other states. And instead of functional rationalizations of his assumptions of the kind so well known and dear to us from Holmes' constitutional opinions, we find metaphysical platitudes such as the statement that the determination of the exchange rate as of the date of breach rather than the date of judgment flows "from fundamental theory," 78 or that the constitutionality of non-forfeiture 75. In a series of articles, Professor Briggs (while admitting the theoretical untenability of a theory which claims full power for each forum to devise its own choice of law rule and yet attributes to foreign states an independent "jurisdiction" for the creation of rights and obligations) has attempted to defend "jurisdictional thinking" in view of "the actual function and operation" of American conflicts law. 77. The Justice preferred the Latin term "obligatio" to the English word "obligation," perhaps because of the broader scope (comprising both torts and contracts) and more clearly defined meaning of the Roman concept. Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) . "Obligatio est juris vinculum quo necessitate astringimur alicujus solvendae rei. . statutes of the lex contractus is based on "the first principles of legal thinking." 71 Several reasons have been suggested for this attitude so strangely out of place in the searching mind of this great judge. Lack of knowledge in the field, traumatic predilection for the power concept due to early experience as a soldier, 0 as well as adherence to a rigidity "innate in the common law," "I have been blamed for this deviation. It would, however, seem more likely that Justice Holmes was prompted by an ideology similar to that of Joseph Story and Joseph Beale, i.e., the earnest, though frustrated, desire to promote and stabilize interstate and international relations. 2 While Holmes and the Restaters chose to fight for the restoration of the past, that other great American conflicts scholar, Judge Learned Hand, trying to follow both Holmes and new trends, has offered "us another compromise. To him an obligation arising from a foreign tort is not, as it was to Holmes, 3 one existing under the foreign law. For "no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign"; 4 and, if the forum looks to the law of the foreign sovereign, it is merely to impose "an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising in the place where the tort occurs." ' But while Judge Hand's "local law" theory 8 3 6 thus purports to reject the assumption of a transcendental rule of choice, it is still one of "divided allegiance" 17 in repeating as an axiom the assumption of a "foreign" tort or contract, the place of which is determined by an implied supernational standard." Where suit was brought against the New York owner of a car involved in an Ontario accident, Ontario law, by imputing the driver's liability to the defendant, would have "to reach beyond its borders," claiming "extra-territorial effect." 89 Those who believe that these dogmas should be completely abandoned might prefer an even more determined "yielding place to new." " We have seen that unitarian compromise characterizes the theories of Holmes and the Restaters who purport to improve on Story's by deriving perfect pluralism from a perfect unitarian order; and of Learned Hand who hopes to escape inconsistency by a new pluralistic definition of an ubiquitous obligation. Unitarian salvation is occasionally even expected from a new international order " beyond pres-ent efforts to revitalize international treaty solutions," 6 or, more realistically, in a comparative approach pooling the experiences of all countries. 7 On the other hand, there are those who have admitted defeat and, forswearing both international and national schemes, have sought refuge in a general appeal to justice," or in special rules for the equitable adjustment of conflicts cases. Brandeis had maintained in a dissenting opinion that "there is no constitutional limitation by virtue of which a statute enacted by a State in the exercise of the police power is necessarily void if, in its operation, contracts made in another State may be affected." 103 And the same justice speaking for the majority of the Court twelve years later, held at least the lex solutionis entitled to the same recognition as the lex contractus."' 0 Similar skepticism about the "vesting" power of the lex contractus had been expressed by other justices long before the Restatement." 5 It was Chief Justice Stone, however, who, both prior and subsequent to the publication of the Restatement, most consistently fought its underlying ideology, thus countering at the same time the Court's repeated attempts at establishing the vested rights theory not only through the alleged requirements of due process but also through the back door of full faith and credit.
In the first respect, speaking for the Court only five years after the publication of the Restatement, he found that at least two states, that of the contract and that of the tort, were "competent to legislate" as to workmen's compensation without denial of due process. 0 6 And in the same case justice Stone rejected the full faith and credit clause as a means of introducing a constitutional system of choice of law 107_ this in conspicuous contrast to his attitude concerning the recognition of foreign judgments, as to which he felt that the very "purpose of the full faith and credit clause" was to alter the "status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties." 101 He also refused to recognize or to deny a state's "jurisdiction" to tax "by the choice of label, by definition previously agreed upon," "I and most eloquently expressed, in the following, now classic statement, his distaste for the rigidity of vested rights and obligations. Rejecting the majority's argument that full faith and credit had to be given to a sister state decree concerning a child's support because only the state of the father's domicile had "the power to impose" such a duty,"' Stone contrasted the (local) right of the several states to pass their own laws with their (interstate) "legislative jurisdiction." "Between the prohibition of the due process clause, acting upon the courts of the state from which such proceedings may be taken, and the mandate of the full faith and credit clause, acting upon the state to which they may be taken, there is an area which federal authority has not occupied." I" While doubt has since been cast on this statement, it alone would justify Professor Cheatham's conclusion that "since Story wrote his great treatise over one hundred years ago no member of the court has contributed more than the late Chief Justice to conflict of laws." 112 Chief Justice Stone's rebellion against Justice Holmes' formalism in conflict of laws finds its counterpart in Cook's and Lorenzen's studies directed against the Restatement and other remnants of Story's jurisdictional compromise.
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While revolutionary at the time of their appearance, these studies have become the theoretical basis of virtually all current research in the field, including Stumberg's important text on the subject. 1 14 Contrary to the Restatement, which Cook has shown to be fallacious in this respect,",' a state "can" affect "persons, things and acts" anywhere in the world subject only to positive rules of international or constitutional law not inherent "in the constitution of the legal universe," so that "by far the larger number of the rules for the solution of cases involvin'g the conflict of laws do not relate to the 'power' or 'jurisdiction' of the particular court or state.. , Thus Story's and Holmes' compromise, which combined a nationalist pluralistic assertion of sovereignty tempered only by comity between nations, with the internationalist, unitary notion of rights and obligations vested under a foreign legislative jurisdiction, could be considered obsolete were it not for the fact that the "local law theory" supplanting it appears to leave us without a guide.
Not "No Law": Outlook
Whether or not the Supreme Court's current attempts at reviving "logical" theorems for the establishment of a constitutional scheme of choice of law 117 will meet the failure of their predecessors, 1 -8 the local law theory, though having effectively fought its opponents, does not offer the final solution. This theory has "the defects of its qualities. Laying the emphasis on the freedom of the forum state to do what it wishes, it may engender the unfortunate attitude that the freedom should be widely used. While in the early stages or the off-type cases of any field of law it is essential that courts have freedom to achieve justice, in the developed stages and the ordinary cases the need is for doctrine which will point to the appropriate decision. So counterbalancing emphasis is needed on the wisdom of ordinarily employing the foreign law as guide in foreign transactions." 119 Moreover, before declaring our unconditional adherence to any one of these theories, we should keep in mind that their differences may bear significantly on highly practical issues, and often perhaps in a manner not altogether desirable. True, we might well prefer the local law theory because it supplies us with the most acceptable explanation for what has so aptly been called the "homeward trend" in the law of conflicts, 12 and because this theory most easily avoids pseudo-problems of inter-temporal conflicts law such as that concerning post-factual changes in the "applicable" foreign law 121 or questions concerning the availability of "machinery" for the enforcement of "foreign" rights and obligations. 2 But in other ways a dogmatic local law theory may give substance to old errors and induce new ones. Mere mention must suffice of such problems as those concerning characterization and renvoi under the lex fori or the lex causae, the treatment of foreign law as a "fact" for purposes of proof, review and judicial notice, and finally the "wide and unexplored" question of the relation between conflicts law and the interspatial interpretation of domestic and foreign legal rules. 2 3 Fortunately, American courts, though often speaking in legalistic terms, have in essence remained unaffected by sterile ideologies and have kept open the way to a more realistic approach. Above all, the exception of "public policy" 4 has been resorted to in order to reach the proper result where a rigid formula would have sacrificed common sense to "logic." But we should abandon the "unruly horse" of public policy wherever we can. "Once you get astride of it, you never know where it will carry you." . 25 What at first appears as an exception based on public policy or other general considerations, at one point must become a new conflicts rule demanding formulation without regard to dogmatic conceptions such as vested rights, legislative jurisdiction, or local sovereignty.
We shall have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the law of conflict of laws which has barely begun to crystallize in a few dozen general maxims, if it is to mature into a full-fledged new branch of the common law, will have to "be broken down to a very much larger number of narrower rules of more specific application, until they are similar to the rules in all other fields of law." "0
In a series of studies, I have tried to demonstrate the growth of new conflicts rules under the aegis not of the fancy of a super-law or the anarchy of "local law," but of a body of common law which, while infinitely more complex than in other legal disciplines, is equally accessible to patient analysis. In these studies in widely scattered fields, I have tried to show that within the traditional doctrine of "jurisdiction'" courts are approaching a new concept of competency similar to that of the civil law and yet superior to it owing to gradual refinement from case to case; 127 that the lex loci delicti in the conflicts law of torts, having long ceased to be the self-evident basis of vested rights, legislative jurisdiction or Justice Holmes' fairness test, has come to reflect ,new economic and special policies pressing for recognition; 128 that divergent policies in the conflicts law of contracts, too, foreshadow new classifications that may yet reach beyond the field of conflicts into domestic law; ' and that the custody of children 130 and the enforcement of duties to support '8' are no longer subject either to "logical" rules of jurisdiction or arbitrary tests of "welfare."
To assist courts in their groping for new generalizations much, much more has been done by others,' and much, much more remains
